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Abstract Individualists claim that collective obligations are reducible to the indi-
vidual obligations of the collective’s members. Collectivists deny this. We set out to
discover who is right by way of a deontic logic of collective action that models
collective actions, abilities, obligations, and their interrelations. On the basis of our
formal analysis, we argue that when assessing the obligations of an individual agent,
we need to distinguish individual obligations from member obligations. If a col-
lective has a collective obligation to bring about a particular state of affairs, then it
might be that no individual in the collective has an individual obligation to bring
about that state of affairs. What follows from a collective obligation is that each
member of the collective has a member obligation to help ensure that the collective
fulfills its collective obligation. In conclusion, we argue that our formal analysis
supports collectivism.
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1 Introduction
Most benefits and harms in the socio-economic realm are brought about by
collectives rather than individuals. Individuals can be held morally responsible for
their actions, but does it also make sense to hold a collective morally responsible for
the things it does or fails to do? An affirmative answer immediately raises the
question of whether collective moral responsibility is reducible to the individual
moral responsibility of the collective’s members. Individualists say yes, collectivists
say no. If the individualists are right, what kind of reduction proves them right?
Two kinds of reduction are relevant here: (1) logical reduction concerns whether
statements about collectives are logically equivalent to conjunctions of statements
about individuals, and (2) ontological reduction concerns whether collective entities
are just sets of individuals. For argumentative purposes, we start from the
assumption that ontological reductionism is true, that is, we assume that a group is a
set of individuals and that a group action is an ordered set of individual actions.1 We
argue that, even if ontological reductionism is true, logical reductionism is false.
In this paper, we focus on the notion of collective obligation. Obligations are
forward-looking responsibilities. They are also a good place to start for studying the
reducibility of backward-looking responsibilities, at least in so far as blamewor-
thiness is concerned. Not fulfilling an obligation is a necessary condition for being
individually blameworthy: if an individual agent is individually blameworthy, then
she failed to fulfill an obligation.2 Similarly, not fulfilling a collective obligation is a
necessary condition for being collectively blameworthy: if a group is collectively
blameworthy, then it failed to fulfill a collective obligation. Because of this, we
employ a two-step strategy to establish whether collective moral responsibility is
logically reducible to individual moral responsibility. We first develop a formal
theory of collective obligations and then use the formal properties we have
identified to find out how to evaluate the actions of individual group members in
case a group of agents does not fulfill its collective obligation.
The structure of our paper is as follows. In Sect. 2, we explain why, in studying
collective moral responsibility, it is important to develop a logical theory of
collective actions and obligations. In Sect. 3, we present our deontic logic of
collective action. This deontic logic is then used to study (1) logical relations
between collective actions and individual actions, and (2) logical relations between
collective obligations and individual obligations. We list some intuitive principles
concerning collective actions and obligations and use our deontic logic to determine
whether or not they are valid. In Sect. 4, we submit that when assessing the
obligations of an individual agent, we must distinguish individual obligations from
member obligations. We argue that, although collective obligations are not logically
1 Copp (2006), List and Pettit (2011), and Hindriks (2013) argue against ontological reductionism about
structured groups.
2 Not fulfilling an obligation, however, is not a sufficient condition for being individually blameworthy:
the agent might have a justification or an excuse for not doing her duty. Furthermore, whereas blame
requires not fulfilling an obligation, supererogatory actions make it clear that praise does not require
fulfilling an obligation.
1086 A. Tamminga, F. Hindriks
123
reducible to individual obligations, given some well-defined assumptions they do
imply member obligations. What follows from a collective obligation is that each
individual has a member obligation to help ensure that the collective fulfills its
collective obligation. In conclusion, we argue that, because member obligations
presuppose collective obligations, our formal analysis supports collectivism.
2 Logical puzzles
The study of collective moral responsibility would be facilitated by a formal theory
that systematically distinguishes valid principles about collective actions and
obligations from invalid ones. Unfortunately, a formal theory of this sort has yet to
be offered. Most of the existing literature on collective moral responsibility remains
informal and relies on everyday examples. Feinberg (1968) discusses the Jesse
James train robbery and concludes that the passengers are collectively responsible
for not having prevented it. Held (1970) takes us to a subway car in which five
bystanders watch someone being strangled and also concludes that the collective is
responsible.3 Sometimes such everyday examples are used as counterexamples to
show that specific logical principles connecting collective actions and obligations
with individual ones are invalid.4 So far so good.
But are there also valid principles that connect collective actions and obligations
with individual ones? Frank Jackson thinks there are: ‘it is surely unbelievable that
there are no valid principles linking the moral status of group acts with the moral
status of constituent individual acts’ (Jackson 1987, p. 107). If we try to show that
Jackson is right, we are presented with a difficulty: although everyday examples can
be used to argue that some logical principles are invalid, they cannot be used to
argue that some such principles are valid. To identify such validities, and also to
systematize the scattered invalidities that were identified with the help of everyday
examples, we need a formal theory of collective actions and obligations. This is by
no means a straightforward matter.
Various authors appear to be puzzled about such a logic of collective actions and
obligations. Let us consider two examples. (1) Kutz (2000a, p. 105) asserts that it is
‘puzzling’ that the conditional ‘If agent i and agent j together see to it that /, then
agent i sees to it that / and agent j sees to it that /’ is invalid, ‘while ordinarily each
conjunct of a true conjunction is also true’. (2) Lawford-Smith (2012, pp. 455–456)
3 Feinberg argues that such collective responsibility cannot be reduced to individual responsibility,
whereas Held defends reductionism about collective responsibility.
4 Held argues that ‘from the judgment ‘‘Collectivity C ought (ought not) to have done A’’, judgments of
the form ‘‘Member M of C ought (ought not) to have done A’’ cannot be derived’ and that ‘judgments
about the moral responsibility of its members are not logically derivable from judgments about the moral
responsibility of a collectivity’ (Held 1970, pp. 474–475). Compare Gilbert: ‘What does the blamewor-
thiness of the collective’s act imply about the personal blameworthiness of any one member of that
collective? From a logical point of view, the short answer is: nothing. Everything depends on the details
of a given member’s particular situation’ (Gilbert 2006, p. 109). Likewise, Isaacs argues that ‘claims
about collective moral responsibility neither entail nor are derivable from claims about individual moral
responsibility’ (Isaacs 2011, p. 24).
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maintains that the conditional ‘If agent i ought to see to it that / ^ w, then agent i
ought to see to it that / and agent i ought to see to it that w’ and the conditional ‘If
agent i and agent j together ought to see to it that /, then agent i ought to see to it
that / and agent j ought to see to it that /’ are both substitution instances of the
logical principle of the distribution of ‘oughts’ over a conjunction. Because she
proposes that we reject the second conditional, she questions the principle’s validity.
The deontic logic of collective action that we present in Sect. 3 does of course
vindicate the validity of the logical principle that the truth of a conjunction implies
the truth of both of its conjuncts. Nonetheless, our deontic logic indicates why
Kutz’s conditional is invalid, why Lawford-Smith’s first conditional is valid, and
why her second conditional is not. That we can draw such conclusions illustrates the
added value of our logic.
In Sects. 3 and 4 we develop a formal framework to study the logical relations
between collective actions and obligations on the one hand and individual actions
and obligations on the other. Our framework will remove puzzlement about the
formal properties of collective action and obligation, and, more generally, provide a
tool to investigate the formal relations between collective and individual respon-
sibility. The framework will therefore also help us to achieve our second goal,
which is to clarify the concept of logical reduction in the debate on individualism
versus collectivism about collective moral responsibility. For these reasons, we
construct a deontic logic of collective action.
3 A deontic logic of collective action
The deontic logic of collective action presented in this section is inspired by John
Horty’s (1996, 2001) deontic logic of agency.5 The present section and the next
extend Horty’s ideas to a formal theory of collective obligations. Our theory
provides clear answers to central questions about the relation between collective and
individual obligations. Can it be the case that an individual in a collective ought to
bring about a certain state of affairs without its being the case that that collective
itself ought to bring about that state of affairs? (Yes.) Can it be the case that a
collective ought to see to it that a certain state of affairs obtains and that an
individual in that collective ought to see to it that that state of affairs does not
obtain? (No.) Are the obligations of a group and all of its subgroups consistent?
(Yes.)
To investigate formal relations between collective and individual obligations, we
make two central idealizing assumptions to filter out factors that interfere with these
relations to the point of trivializing them. Because there are no necessary relations
between obligations generated by different moral codes or between obligations at
different moments in time, we study, first, collective and individual obligations that
5 Our deontic logic of collective action stands in the tradition of the stit (‘sees to it that’) logics of agency
developed by Kanger (1957), Pörn (1970), Kanger (1972), Hansson (1986), von Kutschera (1986), Horty
and Belnap (1995), Belnap et al. (2001), Horty (2001), Kooi and Tamminga (2008), Carmo (2010), and
Tamminga (2013).
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are generated by the same moral code and, secondly, collective and individual
obligations that hold at a single moment in time.
We use the term ‘group’ for any random collection of individuals (Held 1970).
As a consequence, any combination of individual actions performed by such a
random collection of individuals will be considered a group action performed by
that random collective. Naturally, relaxing these assumptions may well result in
different answers to the main questions about the relation between collective and
individual obligations. It should therefore be borne in mind that our deontic logic of
collective action is only a first step towards a fully-fledged formal analysis of
collective actions and obligations.
Our deontic logic is, however, meant to be general in the following respect. Some
group actions are just sets of individual actions. Think, for instance, of harming the
ozone layer. Other group actions involve collective intentions, such as the collective
intention to move the piano upstairs together. To attain a level of generality that
enables us to study common features of group actions that involve collective
intentions (like moving the piano upstairs) and of group actions that lack them (like
harming the ozone layer), we initially assume that the sets of individuals who
perform group actions have not formed a collective intention. On the basis of this
assumption, we model group actions as sets of individual actions. Later on, we relax
this assumption to accommodate joint actions generated by collective intentions as
well.6 We model collective intentions in a minimal way as group plans that have
been adopted by all members of the group.
This technical section proceeds as follows. First, we define our formal language
and, by way of illustration, translate the statements that puzzled Kutz and Lawford-
Smith into this language. Secondly, we define the deontic game models that
interpret the formal language and then check whether the translations of Kutz’s and
Lawford-Smith’s statements are valid, that is, whether the translations of these
statements are true in all models. Thirdly, we justify the answers to the questions
that opened this section by checking the validity of some general claims about
relations between group actions and subgroup actions and between group
obligations and subgroup obligations. All claims are proved in the ‘‘Appendix’’.
3.1 Formal language
Our propositional modal language L is built from a finite set N ¼ fi1; . . .; ing of
individual agents and a countable set P ¼ fp1; p2; . . .g of atomic formulas. The
formal language L is the smallest set (in terms of set-theoretical inclusion) that
satisfies conditions (i) through (iv):
(i) P  L
(ii) If / 2 L, then :/ 2 L and e/ 2 L
(iii) If / 2 L and w 2 L, then ð/ ^ wÞ 2 L
6 Collective intentions play a central role in the analysis of joint actions. See, for instance, Tuomela and
Miller (1988), Gilbert (1990), Searle (1990), and Bratman (1992). For analyses of collective action that
lack collective intentions, see Jackson (1987), Kutz (2000b), and Chant (2007).
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(iv) If G  N and / 2 L, then ½G/ 2 L and ðGÞ/ 2 L.
We omit parentheses, brackets, and braces if the omission does not give rise to
ambiguities. The operators _, !, and h abbreviate the usual constructions.
This propositional modal language can be used to express alethic statements like
‘It is possible that /’ (formalized as e/), agentive statements like ‘Group G of
agents sees to it that /’ (formalized as ½G/), and deontic statements like ‘Group G
of agents ought to see to it that /’ (formalized as ðGÞ/). Abilities can then be
expressed by a combination of operators: ‘Group G of agents has the ability to see to
it that /’ is formalized as e½G/.7
The statements that puzzled Kutz (2000a, p. 105) and Lawford-Smith
(2012, pp. 455–456) are:
(1) If agent i and agent j together see to it that /, then agent i sees to it that / and
agent j sees to it that /.
(2) If agent i ought to see to it that both / and w, then agent i ought to see to it
that / and agent i ought to see to it that w.
(3) If agent i and agent j together ought to see to it that /, then agent i ought to
see to it that / and agent j ought to see to it that /.
They can now be translated as (10), (20), and (30):
(10) ½i; j/ ! ð½i/ ^ ½j/Þ
(20) ðiÞð/ ^ wÞ ! ððiÞ/ ^ ðiÞwÞ
(30) ði; jÞ/ ! ððiÞ/ ^ ðjÞ/Þ.
To show that (20) is valid and that (10) and (30) are not, we need to know the
conditions under which a formula of our modal language is true. These truth-
conditions are specified by our deontic game models.
3.2 Deontic game models
What ingredients do we need to specify truth-conditions for agentive and deontic
statements? Intuitively, the truth of an agentive statement like ‘GroupG of agents sees to
it that /’ requires that group G choose and perform a group action from among a range
of group actions that are available to the group and that by performing this group action
the group ensures that / is true. Moreover, if we order the available group actions in
terms of how well they promote a given moral code, then, intuitively, the truth of a
deontic statement like ‘Group G of agents ought to see to it that /’ requires that every
best group action that is available to group G ensures, if performed, that / is true.
To convert these intuitive requirements for the truth of agentive and deontic
statements into truth-conditions, we use a model theory based on the possible-
worlds semantics for standard deontic logic (Hilpinen 1971, pp. 13–15). A
possible-worlds model for standard deontic logic involves a non-empty set of
possible worlds, a set of possible worlds that are deontically ideal with respect to a
given moral code (this set of deontically ideal possible worlds is a subset of the set
7 For a formal analysis of the concept of individual ability, see Horty (2001, pp. 19–29).
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of possible worlds), and a valuation function that assigns to each atomic formula a
set of possible worlds where that formula is true. In such a possible-worlds model, a
deontic statement like ‘It ought to be that /’ is true if and only if / is true in all
deontically ideal possible worlds.
Our deontic game models are possible-worlds models for standard deontic logic
where the role of possible worlds is played by possible action profiles (to be defined
below). Hence, a deontic game model consists of a set of possible action profiles, a
set of possible action profiles that are deontically ideal with respect to a given moral
code (this set of deontically ideal possible action profiles is a subset of the set of
possible action profiles), and a valuation function that assigns to each atomic
formula a set of possible action profiles where that formula is true.
Formally, a deontic game model involves a finite set N ¼ fi1; . . .; ing of
individual agents. Each agent i in N is assigned a non-empty and finite set Ai of
available individual actions.8 We use ai and a
0
i as variables for actions in the set Ai
of actions that are available to agent i. The set A of possible action profiles is given
by the Cartesian product i2NAi of all the individual agents’ sets of actions. Note
that A (¼ i2NAi) is non-empty, because all the Ai’s are non-empty. We use a and a0
as variables for action profiles in the set A of possible action profiles.9 The set of
deontically ideal possible action profiles (which is a subset of the set A of possible
action profiles) is defined by a deontic ideality function d that assigns to each
possible action profile a in A a value d(a) that is either 1 (if a is deontically ideal) or
0 (if a is not deontically ideal).10 A valuation function v assigns to each atomic
formula p in P a (possibly empty) set v(p) of possible action profiles.
As an illustration, let us define a deontic game model M1, in which there are two
agents i and j. Let Ai ¼ fai; a0ig and Aj ¼ faj; a0jg, that is, the actions that are available
to agent i are ai and a
0
i, and the actions that are available to agent j are aj and a
0
j. The full
set A of possible action profiles is then given by Ai  Aj ¼ fðai; ajÞ; ðai; a0jÞ;
ða0i; ajÞ; ða0i; a0jÞg. We define the deontic ideality function d as follows:
dðai; ajÞ ¼ 1
dðai; a0jÞ ¼ 0
dða0i; ajÞ ¼ 0
dða0i; a0jÞ ¼ 1:
Accordingly, the action profiles ðai; ajÞ and ða0i; a0jÞ are deontically ideal, and the
action profiles ðai; a0jÞ and ða0i; ajÞ are not. Lastly, we define the valuation function v
(the valuations of the other atomic formulas are left unspecified):
8 We require finiteness for expository reasons only. If we were to admit infinite sets of individual actions,
we would have to generalize the truth-condition for deontic statements accordingly—see footnote 12.
9 We adopt the notational conventions of Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, Section 1.7).
10 The deontic ideality function represents a given moral code. Our binary ordering of the action profiles
in terms of deontic ideality can also be seen to reflect a simple preference ordering of agents who classify
action profiles unanimously as ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Deontic game models thus resemble Schelling’s
(1960, p. 84) pure-collaboration games and Bacharach’s (2006, p. 122) coordination contexts.
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vðpÞ ¼ fðai; ajÞg
vðqÞ ¼ fðai; ajÞ; ðai; a0jÞ; ða0i; a0jÞg:
Accordingly, the atomic formula p is true at action profile ðai; ajÞ and false at the
other action profiles, and the atomic formula q is false at action profile ða0i; ajÞ and
true at the other action profiles.
The deontic game model M1 can be pictured as in Fig. 1. The rows represent the
actions that are available to agent i, and the columns represent the actions that are
available to agent j. Each cell therefore represents an action profile. Moreover, each
cell contains a number that indicates whether or not the corresponding action profile
is deontically ideal. Finally, we use the convention that a cell contains an atomic
formula if and only if that atomic formula is true at the corresponding action profile.
We now turn to group actions. Following the literature on the logic of collective
action,11 we think of an action performed by a group as a combination of individual
actions performed by the group’s members. In the present setting, we make the idealizing
assumption that, conversely, any combination of individual actions performed by the
members of any group is a group action performed by that group (we relax this latter
assumption in Sect. 4, where we introduce plan-based collective intentions which allow
us to make a distinction between aggregate behaviour and group agency).
Accordingly, for each non-empty group G  N we define the set AG of group
actions available to group G as AG ¼ i2GAi. We use aG and a0G as variables for
group actions in the set AG of group actions that are available to group G. Given an
action profile a in a deontic game model and a group G  N, we also use aG to refer
to the combination of individual actions of G’s members in a. Likewise, we use aG
to refer to the combination of individual actions of all of G’s non-members in a. For
example, given an action profile ðai; aj; ak; alÞ in a four-agent deontic game model
and the group G ¼ fi; kg, we have aG ¼ ðai; akÞ and aG ¼ ðaj; alÞ. In the same
fashion, we use AG to refer to i2ðNGÞAi.
Action profiles are fully determined by combinations of actions of all the
individual agents. Hence, an agent only partly determines an action profile by
performing an action, and this holds irrespective of whether the agent is an
individual or a group. By performing an action an agent only makes a contribution
to realizing an action profile. Nonetheless, by performing an action an agent can
make statements true or false. In the present setting, given a specific action profile, a
group sees to it that a particular statement is true if and only if the group’s
contribution to this action profile suffices to ensure the truth of this statement,
regardless of the actions of the group’s non-members. To be precise, given an action
profile a, a group G sees to it that / if and only if for all action profiles a0 with
a0G ¼ aG it holds that / is true in a0. (The truth-condition for individual agency is
obtained by filling in fig for G.)
11 See Hansson (1986), Tuomela (1989), Belnap et al. (2001, Ch. 10), Horty (2001, pp. 30–33), and
Carmo (2010).
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We model group obligations as follows: a group ought to see to it that a particular
statement is true if and only if all of its optimal actions ensure the truth of that
statement. To discover which of the actions available to a group are optimal, we
order the available actions in terms of the deontic ideality of their possible action
profiles. We thus transform the given binary deontic ideality ordering of the action
profiles in A into an ordering of the actions available to group G, that is, into an
ordering of AG. The actions that are best in this ordering of AG are group G’s optimal
actions. Following Horty (2001, p. 68), we order a group’s available actions in
terms of dominance. Given two actions aG and a
0
G that are available to a group G, aG
weakly dominates a0G (notation: aG  a0G) if and only if aG promotes deontic ideality
at least as well as a0G, regardless of what the group’s non-members do:
Definition 1 (Dominance) Let M ¼ hN; ðAiÞ; d; vi be a deontic game model. Let
G  N be a group of agents. Let aG; a0G 2 AG be actions available to group G. Then
aG  a0G iff for all a00G 2 AG it holds that d aG; a00G
 
 d a0G; a00G
 
:
Strong dominance is defined in terms of weak dominance: aG 	 a0G if and only if
aG  a0G and a0G 6 aG.
A group’s optimal actions are the ones that are not strongly dominated:
Definition 2 (Optimality) Let M ¼ hN; ðAiÞ; d; vi be a deontic game model. Let
G  N be a group of agents. Then the set of G’s optimal actions, denoted by
OptimalðGÞ, is given by
OptimalðGÞ ¼ aG 2 AG : there is no a0G 2 AG such that a0G 	 aG
 
:
Finally, we need to specify truth-conditions for the formulas of our propositional
modal language. We write M; a 
 / if a formula / is true at an action profile a of a
deontic game model M. The truth-conditions are given inductively:12
Definition 3 (Truth-conditions) Let M ¼ hN; ðAiÞ; d; vi be a deontic game model.
Let G  N be a group of agents. Let a 2 A be an action profile. Let p 2 P be an
atomic formula and /;w 2 L arbitrary formulas. Then
Fig. 1 Deontic game model M1
12 If we were to admit infinite sets of individual actions (and hence admit infinite sets of action profiles),
then the truth-condition for deontic statements would be as follows: M; a 
 ðGÞ/ if and only if for all
a0 2 A with M; a0 6
 / there is an a00 2 A with M; a00 
 / such that (i) a00G 	 a0G and (ii) for all a000 2 A with
a000G  a00G it holds that M; a000 
 /. Compare Horty (2001, p. 77). This generalized truth-condition
preserves the theorems below that, at first sight, seem to rely on the finiteness condition—Theorems 1(i),
4(i), 4(ii) and 5(i).
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M; a 
 p iff a 2 vðpÞ
M; a 
 :/ iff M; a 6
 /
M; a 
 / ^ w iff M; a 
 / and M; a 
 w
M; a 
 e/ iff there is an a0 2 A such that M; a0 
 /
M; a 
 ½G/ iff for all a0 2 A with a0G ¼ aG it holds that M; a0 
 /
M; a 
 ðGÞ/ iff for all a0 2 A with a0G 2 OptimalðGÞ it holds that M; a0 
 /:
We adopt the following standard conventions: given a deontic game model M, we
write M 
 / if for all action profiles a in A it holds that M; a 
 /. A formula / is
valid (notation: 
 /) if for all deontic game models M it holds that M 
 /.
3.3 Validities and invalidities
We are now in a position to justify the answers to the opening questions of this
technical section. To do so, we check the validity of some general claims about
relations between group actions and obligations on the one hand and subgroup
actions and obligations on the other. But first we make a general observation.
Because deontic game models are possible-worlds models in disguise, our agentive
and deontic group modalities inherit some basic properties of modalities whose
truth-conditions are specified by universal conditions on possible worlds. Accord-
ingly, all of our modalities are normal modal operators: they validate the principle
of necessitation and the principle of distribution over implication.13 Although it is
straightforward to define non-normal agentive and deontic group modalities on the
basis of our normal ones, we avoid unnecessary complications and stick to normal
group modalities in the theorems below.14 All claims are proved in the ‘‘Appendix’’.
Our first theorem states some of the basic properties of our deontic logic of
collective action. First, if group G has an obligation to see to it that /, then group G
has the ability to see to it that /, that is, it is possible that group G sees to it that /.
This is the well-known principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’.15
Secondly, group G sees to it that both / and w if and only if both group G sees to
it that / and group G sees to it that w. Thirdly, group G ought to see to it that both /
and w if and only if both group G ought to see to it that / and group G ought to see to
13 That is, every modality H such that H 2 fh; ½G; ðGÞg validates the principle of necessitation: ‘if 
 /,
then 
 H/’, and the principle of distribution over implication: ‘
 Hð/ ! wÞ ! ðH/ ! HwÞ’.
14 We could introduce two additional non-normal operators, ‘Group G of agents deliberately sees to it
that /’ (formalized as ½½G/) and ‘Group G of agents deliberately ought to see to it that /’ (formalized as
ððGÞÞ/), and stipulate the following truth-conditions for them: M; a 
 ½½G/ if and only if
M; a 
 ½G/ ^ :h/, and M; a 
 ððGÞÞ/ if and only if M; a 
 ðGÞ/ ^ :h/. The validities for these
new operators are the same as the ones listed below, with two exceptions: in Theorems 1(ii) and 1(iii), the
condition :h/ ^ :hw must be added to the left-hand side of the bi-conditional. Horty and Belnap
(1995) study the single-agent version of the non-normal agentive modality ½½G.
15 Ethical theorists debate whether the principle of ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ holds in every conceivable
situation. Key references include Kekes (1984), Sinnott-Armstrong (1988), Howard-Snyder (2006), and
Graham (2011).
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it that w. Note that the validity of the third claim implies that the statement (20)
above, ðiÞð/ ^ wÞ ! ððiÞ/ ^ ðiÞwÞ, is also valid.
Theorem 1 Let /;w 2 L and G  N. Then
(i) 
 ðGÞ/ ! e½G/
(ii) 
 ½Gð/ ^ wÞ $ ð½G/ ^ ½GwÞ
(iii) 
 ðGÞð/ ^ wÞ $ ððGÞ/ ^ ðGÞwÞ.
Our second theorem is on relations between group actions and subgroup actions.
Let F be a subgroup of a group G. First, if subgroup F sees to it that /, then group G
sees to it that /.16 Secondly, the converse implication does not hold: it might be that
group G sees to it that /, whereas subgroup F does not see to it that /. For a
counterexample, note that in the deontic game model M1 of Fig. 1, it holds that
M1; ðai; ajÞ 
 ½i; jp and M1; ðai; ajÞ 6
 ½ip. Therefore, the statement (10) above,
½i; j/ ! ð½i/ ^ ½j/Þ, is invalid.
Theorem 2 Let / 2 L. Then
(i) 
 ½F/ ! ½G/ for all F  G  N
(ii) 6
 ½G/ ! ½F/ for some F  G  N.
Our third theorem is on relations between group obligations and subgroup
obligations. Let F be a subgroup of a group G. First, the fact that subgroup F ought
to see to it that / does not imply that group G ought to see to it that /: it might be
that subgroup F has an obligation to see to it that /, whereas group G does not have
an obligation to see to it that /. Secondly, the converse implication does not hold
either: it might be that group G has an obligation to see to it that /, whereas
subgroup F does not have an obligation to see to it that /. For a counterexample to
the second claim, note that in the deontic game model M1 of Fig. 1, for all action
profiles a it holds that M1; a 
 ði; jÞq and M1; a 6
 ðiÞq. Therefore, the statement (30)
above, ði; jÞ/ ! ððiÞ/ ^ ðjÞ/Þ, is invalid.17
16 This seems awkward as long as we do not make the following distinction: ‘[t]here is more than one
thing that one might mean by ½G/. First, one might mean that the bearers of G, without any outside help,
guarantee that /, on the basis of a prior simultaneous real choice by each of them. There is also a second,
stronger, account. In this version the bearers of G, without any outside help, and with the essential input of
each of them, guarantee that /’ (Belnap et al. 2001, p. 282—notation adapted). We model the first of
these two notions of group action.
17 Regan claims that ‘all subgroups of any group which produces best consequences produce best
consequences also’ and, moreover, that this statement is equivalent to the statement that ‘there can be no
conflict between the production of good consequences by large groups and by smaller included groups’
(Regan 1980, p. 108). Compare Regan (1980, pp. 54 and 56). In the present setting, Regan’s first
statement is similar to ðGÞ/ ! ðFÞ/, which is invalid (Theorem 3(ii)). His second statement is similar to
ðGÞ/ ! :ðFÞ:/, which is valid (Theorem 4(ii)). For a detailed comparison between Regan’s
construction of obligations and one that is closely related to ours, see Horty (2001, Ch. 6).
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Theorem 3 Let / 2 L. Then
(i) 6
 ðFÞ/ ! ðGÞ/ for some F  G  N
(ii) 6
 ðGÞ/ ! ðFÞ/ for some F  G  N.
Our fourth theorem is also on relations between group obligations and subgroup
obligations. Let F be a subgroup of group G. First, if subgroup F ought to see to it
that / is true, then it is not the case that group G ought to see to it that / is false.
Secondly, if group G ought to see to it that / is true, then it is not the case that
subgroup F ought to see to it that / is false.
Theorem 4 Let / 2 L and F  G  N. Then
(i) 
 ðFÞ/ ! :ðGÞ:/
(ii) 
 ðGÞ/ ! :ðFÞ:/.
Our fifth theorem is also on relations between group obligations and subgroup
obligations, but now we consider two subgroups rather than one. To state the
theorem clearly, we introduce some additional terminology. A group has an
obligation regarding / if it ought to see to it that / is true or it ought to see to it that
/ is false. Two groups have contradictory obligations regarding /, if the one ought
to see to it that / is true, whereas the other ought to see to it that / is false. Two
groups have consistent obligations regarding /, if they do not have contradictory
obligations regarding /.
Let F 1 and F 2 be subgroups of a group G. First, if two subgroups F 1 and F 2
have no common members, then their obligations regarding / are consistent.
Secondly, if two subgroups F 1 and F 2 do have common members, then they might
have contradictory obligations regarding /. Thirdly, if two subgroups F 1 and F 2 of
a group G have contradictory obligations regarding /, then group G does not have an
obligation regarding /. Fourthly, and conversely, if group G has an obligation
regarding /, then the obligations of its subgroups F 1 and F 2 regarding / are
consistent.
Theorem 5 Let / 2 L. Then
(i) 
 ðF 1Þ/ ! :ðF 2Þ:/ for all F 1;F 2  N such that F 1 \ F 2 ¼ ;
(ii) 6
 ðF 1Þ/ ! :ðF 2Þ:/ for some F 1;F 2  N
(iii) 
 ððF 1Þ/ ^ ðF 2Þ:/Þ ! ð:ðGÞ/ ^ :ðGÞ:/Þ for all F 1;F 2  G  N
(iv) 
 ððGÞ/ _ ðGÞ:/Þ ! :ððF 1Þ/ ^ ðF 2Þ:/Þ for all F 1;F 2  G  N.
To illustrate Theorem 5(ii), we need some seaside drama: far off the coast, a
person is on the verge of drowning. He can be saved by Angela, Bob, and Charlotte,
but only if they act together in specific pairs. Angela is an excellent swimmer, Bob a
moderate one, and although Charlotte is a weak swimmer, she is the only one who
can operate the motorized dinghy anchored nearby. If Angela and Bob work
together they will be able to save the drowning person by swimming up to him
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immediately: Angela will arrive first, Bob somewhat later, and together they will
bring the person back to shore. By contrast, if Bob and Charlotte work together they
will be able to save the drowning person by using the dinghy: on arrival, Bob will
jump into the water, and together he and Charlotte will manage to pull the person
into the dinghy and bring him back to shore. Angela and Bob have a collective
obligation to swim. Bob and Charlotte have a collective obligation not to swim.
These two collective obligations cannot both be fulfilled. After all, the former
requires both Angela and Bob to swim and the latter requires both Bob and
Charlotte not to swim. This shows that subgroups that have common members can
indeed have contradictory obligations regarding some proposition. Note also that the
group consisting of Angela, Bob, and Charlotte has neither a collective obligation to
swim nor a collective obligation not to swim.18
In sum, our deontic game models can be used to specify truth-conditions for
formulas expressing group actions, abilities, obligations, and their interrelations.
They thereby make it possible to check the validity of some central claims about
relations between group obligations and subgroup obligations. In the next section,
we argue that our deontic game models can also be used to make a principled
distinction—crucial to our defence of collectivism about collective moral respon-
sibility—between individual obligations and member obligations.
4 Individual obligations and member obligations
If a group has a collective obligation and an individual wishes to assess her
obligations, it matters whether the individual is a member of the group or not. To
make sense of this simple observation within our formal framework, we make a
principled distinction between individual obligations and member obligations and
what it means to fulfill such obligations.19 An individual obligation is an obligation
that an individual should fulfill regardless of the collective obligations of the groups
of which she is a member. We say that an individual agent fulfills her individual
obligation if and only if she performs one of her optimal individual actions.
Likewise, a group fulfills its collective obligation if and only if it performs one of its
optimal group actions. (Note that, just like an individual agent, a group of agents, by
performing an optimal action, brings about all the states of affairs that it ought to
bring about.) If an individual is a member of a group, a member obligation towards
that group is an obligation that an individual should fulfill in order to help ensure
that the group fulfills its collective obligation.20
18 See Collins (2013, p. 234) for a similar beach example.
19 If we read ‘direct wrongdoing’ as not fulfilling an individual obligation and ‘participatory
wrongdoing’ as not fulfilling a member obligation, then we do something here that Kutz deems
impossible: ‘[w]e will never find a single argument for distinguishing between participatory and direct
wrongdoing, for the simple reason that there is no single framework for assessing accountability’ (Kutz
2000a, p. 148).
20 See Collins (2017) for an informal, but more comprehensive, analysis of ‘membership duties’.
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How are we to understand the relation between collective obligations and
member obligations? To answer this question, consider a strategic situation
represented by a deontic game model. Assume that the individual agents involved
are able to communicate and team up. Suppose that some individual agents decide
to bundle their strengths and act as a team so as to be better able to promote deontic
ideality.21 The members of the newly formed team will then have to determine
which of their options are best, that is, which of the group actions available to them
as a team are optimal. To discover these optimal group actions, the members of the
team must reason from the standpoint of the team rather than from their individual
perspectives. In doing so, they are engaged in we-reasoning (Hakli et al. 2010;
Tuomela 2013).22 We take it that the outcome of this reasoning process is a set of
optimal group actions. The team fulfills its collective obligation if and only if it
performs one of those optimal group actions. Accordingly, the team members will
have to design and adopt a group plan to coordinate their individual actions such
that the composition of their individual actions amounts to an optimal group action
(Tamminga and Duijf 2017, Section 3). The group plan thus specifies which
individual actions the team members should perform to ensure that the team itself
fulfills its collective obligation. Once the team members, aiming to fulfill a
collective obligation, have adopted a group plan, a team member fulfills her member
obligation towards the team if and only if she acts according to plan.
Transposing Bratman’s characterization of practical reasoning from an individ-
ualistic to a collective perspective, we can think of a group plan as providing ‘a filter
on options that are potential solutions’ (Bratman 1987, p. 35) to a group’s
coordination problem. Once adopted, a group plan coordinates the actions of the
group members: it permits them to act simultaneously and unconditionally, in the
full belief that every group member is acting according to plan. We make the natural
assumption that after the group members have adopted a group plan to coordinate
their actions, it is common knowledge among them that the plan has been adopted.
The formation and adoption of a group plan therefore amounts to forming a
collective intention. Group actions regulated by such a plan-based collective
intention are known as shared or joint actions.
If there is a morally significant outcome that requires contributions from several
individual agents, then each has an obligation to perform a relevant contributory
action. In light of this we assume that when the group members adopt a group plan
aimed at realizing a morally significant outcome, the individual members have an
obligation to contribute to it.
Given a deontic game model in which a group of agents aims to fulfill its
collective obligation, it will be convenient to think of a group plan as a non-empty
21 Held argues that a random collection of agents might even have a duty to do so: ‘the random collection
can be held morally responsible for failing to make a decision on which action to take’ (Held
1970, p. 479). See also Collins (2013) and Hindriks (2019).
22 In the theoretical economics literature, the preferred term is team reasoning (Bacharach 1999, 2006;
Sugden 1993, 2000, 2003). Bacharach (2006, p. 121) writes: ‘[r]oughly, somebody ‘‘team-reasons’’ if she
works out the best feasible combination of actions for all the members of her team, then does her part in
it.’ Hakli et al. (2010) provide a detailed comparison of we-reasoning and team reasoning.
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subset of the set of the group’s optimal actions. By adopting a group plan, the group
members agree to perform one of the group actions in the plan. To give a definition
of how such a plan specifies the member obligations of the group members, let us
first consider plans that consist of a single optimal group action (this might be just
one out of several of the group’s optimal actions). Given a plan that consists of a
single optimal group action, it is obvious that if each group member performs her
contribution to that single optimal group action, then the group itself performs an
optimal group action and thus fulfills its group obligation. We therefore propose the
following definition: given a plan consisting of a single optimal group action, a
group member fulfills her member obligation specified by the plan if and only if she
performs the action that is her component action of the single optimal group action
in that plan. (Things become more complicated, but also more realistic, if a plan
consists of several distinct optimal group actions out of which an arbitrary one is to
be performed—more on this at the end of this section.)
Individual obligations should be distinguished clearly from member obligations,
because fulfilling an individual obligation is neither necessary nor sufficient for
fulfilling a member obligation. This can be illustrated with the Figs. 2 and 3.23 To
see that fulfilling an individual obligation is not sufficient for fulfilling a member
obligation, consider the model of Fig. 2. There, it holds that agent i fulfills her
individual obligation if and only if she performs one of the actions ai and a
0
i, because
both actions are optimal for her. Moreover, given the group plan fðai; ajÞg, agent i
fulfills her member obligation specified by that plan if and only if she performs
action ai. Hence, by performing action a
0
i agent i fulfills her individual obligation
without fulfilling her member obligation. Fulfilling an individual obligation is
therefore not sufficient for fulfilling a member obligation.
To illustrate this, we return to the seaside, where a person is on the verge of
drowning. Suppose now that Angela and Bob will save the drowning person if they
both swim. They will also save the drowning person if they both use the motorized
dinghy. If one of them swims and the other uses the boat, the person will drown. For
Angela, it holds that if she has to act regardless of the collective obligations of the
groups of which she is a member, then the two actions that are available to her—
swimming and using the boat—are equally good: given that she must act alone, she
Fig. 2 Not sufficient
Fig. 3 Not necessary
23 For clarity, we suppress the valuation function of the models.
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does the best she can by performing either of these actions. Accordingly, were she to
perform either of these two individually optimal actions, she would fulfill her
individual obligation. Given that Angela and Bob coordinate their actions by
adopting the group plan to save the drowning person by swimming, it holds that if
Angela were to use the boat, then she would fulfill her individual obligation without
fulfilling her member obligation.
To see that fulfilling an individual obligation is not necessary for fulfilling a
member obligation, consider the model of Fig. 3. There, it holds that agent i fulfills
her individual obligation if and only if she performs action ai, because it is her only
optimal action. Moreover, given the group plan fða0i; ajÞg, agent i fulfills her
member obligation specified by the plan if and only if she performs action a0i.
Hence, by performing action a0i agent i fulfills her member obligation without
fulfilling her individual obligation. Fulfilling an individual obligation is therefore
not necessary for fulfilling a member obligation. As a consequence, reasons for
fulfilling an individual obligation might outweigh reasons for fulfilling a member
obligation and vice versa.
To illustrate this, let us slightly change the seaside example. Suppose now that
Angela and Bob can each save the drowning person on their own. Angela can
perform either of two actions: swimming or not swimming. By swimming she will
save the drowning person. Likewise, Bob can perform either of two actions: using
the boat or not using the boat. By using the boat he will save the drowning person.
For Angela, it holds that if she has to act regardless of the collective obligations of
the groups of which she is a member, then the best she can do is to swim.
Accordingly, she would fulfill her individual obligation were she to swim. Given
that Angela and Bob coordinate their actions by adopting the group plan to save the
drowning person by Angela’s not swimming and Bob’s using the boat, then it holds
that if Angela were not to swim, she would fulfill her member obligation without
fulfilling her individual obligation.
So far we have only studied member obligations specified by a plan consisting of
a single optimal group action. This is unnecessarily restrictive and unrealistic. To
allow for member obligations specified by plans that consist of several distinct
optimal group actions, we propose the following general definition: given a plan
consisting of one or more optimal group actions, a group member fulfills her
member obligation specified by the plan if and only if she performs an action that is
her component action of one of the optimal group actions in that plan.
It is important to note that a plan consisting of several distinct optimal group
actions does not necessarily guarantee the truth of the conditional ‘If each group
member fulfills her member obligation specified by the plan, then the group itself
fulfills its group obligation’. To see this, let us take a second look at the model of
Fig. 2. Consider the plan fðai; ajÞ; ða0i; a0jÞg. Suppose that agent i performs action ai
and that agent j performs action a0j. Then both agent i and agent j fulfill their member
obligation specified by the plan, although by performing the group action ðai; a0jÞ the
group does not fulfill its group obligation. This plan therefore fails to guarantee the
truth of the conditional. It fails to solve the group members’ coordination problem.
It would therefore be irrational to adopt such a plan. It is a bad plan.
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A good plan—a rational plan—solves the group members’ coordination problem,
that is, it guarantees the truth of the conditional ‘If each group member fulfills her
member obligation specified by the plan, then the group itself fulfills its group
obligation’.24 Equivalently, it guarantees the truth of the conditional ‘If the group
does not fulfill its group obligation, then there is at least one group member who
does not fulfill her member obligation specified by the plan’.25 A bad plan fails to
guarantee the truth of these conditionals.
To ensure that a plan solves the group members’ coordination problem, the plan
has to have a certain structure, namely that whichever group member performs
whatever action that is her component action of one of the optimal group actions in
the plan, the result is always one of the optimal group actions in the plan. To be
precise, a plan should be closed under component individual actions:26
Definition 4 (Closedness) Let M ¼ hN; ðAiÞ; d; vi be a deontic game model. Let
G  N be a group of agents. Let B  AG. Then B is closed if and only if for all
aG; a
0
G 2 B and all i 2 G it holds that ðai; a0GiÞ 2 B.
A few examples: fðai; a0jÞg is closed (as is every set consisting of a single group
action). Likewise, fðai; ajÞ; ðai; a0jÞg is closed. The set fðai; ajÞ; ða0i; a0jÞg is not,
because ðai; a0jÞ is not in it. The set fðai; ajÞ; ðai; a0jÞ; ða0i; ajÞg is not closed, because
ða0i; a0jÞ is not in it.
A closed plan guarantees the truth of the conditional ‘If each group member
fulfills her member obligation specified by the plan, then the group itself fulfills its
group obligation’. If each group member fulfills her member obligation specified by
a closed plan, each group member performs an action that is her component action
of one of the optimal group actions in that plan. Because the plan is closed, it must
be that this combination of the actions performed by the group members is in the
plan. Because the plan only contains optimal group actions, this combination of
actions is an optimal group action. Hence, the group members perform an optimal
group action. Therefore, if each group member fulfills her member obligation
specified by a closed plan, then the group itself fulfills its group obligation. A closed
plan thus solves the group members’ coordination problem.
Our account of the relation between group obligations, member obligations, and
individual obligations has a number of notable features. First, it shows that fulfilling
an individual obligation is neither necessary nor sufficient for fulfilling a member
obligation. Secondly, if each group member fulfills her member obligation specified
24 Compare Regan: ‘[i]f the members of G all do their part in the best pattern of behaviour for the
members of G given the behaviour of non-members, it is clear that the members of G produce the best
consequences possible as a group’ (Regan 1980, p. 138—notation adapted).
25 This is a possible interpretation of the principle ‘If a group act is wrong, at least one of its constituent
individual acts is wrong’ (Jackson 1987, p. 107). On the basis of an informal counterexample, Jackson
argues that this principle is invalid (Jackson 1987, pp. 102–103). In our view, Jackson’s counterexample
does not invalidate the principle, because it relies on different concepts of obligations—group obligations,
member obligations, individual obligations, conditional individual obligations—that are not systemat-
ically distinguished.
26 Our concept of closedness goes back to Nash (1951, p. 290), where it is called interchangeability.
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by a closed plan, then the group itself fulfills its group obligation. Thirdly, if a group
does not fulfill its group obligation even though its members adopted a plan to solve
their coordination problem, then one of three things has happened: (1) the adopted
plan was not closed, each group member fulfilled her member obligation specified
by the plan, but the combination of the actions performed by the group members
was not an optimal group action; (2) the adopted plan was not closed, there was at
least one group member who did not fulfill her member obligation specified by the
plan, and the combination of the actions performed by the group members was not
an optimal group action; or (3) the adopted plan was closed, there was at least one
group member who did not fulfill her member obligation specified by the plan, and
the combination of the actions performed by the group members was not an optimal
group action. The third possibility supports the counterfactual ‘If each group
member had fulfilled her member obligation specified by the plan, then the group
itself would have fulfilled its group obligation’, while the second possibility does
not. We submit that our account of member obligations helps us to better understand
reductionism about collective moral responsibility.
5 Reductionism revisited
Our analysis does not support logical reductionism about group obligations and
individual obligations. Recall that logical reductionism concerns whether statements
about collectives are logically equivalent to conjunctions of statements about
individuals. As we showed in Sect. 3.3, group obligations do not imply (and nor are
they implied by) individual obligations. Nonetheless, it might seem that our analysis
supports logical reductionism about group obligations and member obligations:
given a closed plan consisting of one or more optimal group actions, it holds that if
each group member fulfills her member obligation specified by the plan, then the
group itself fulfills its group obligation. Therefore, given that the closedness
condition is met, the fulfillment of each member obligation implies the fulfillment of
a group obligation. Is this a case of logical reductionism?
First, to meet the demands of logical reductionism, the converse conditional must
also be valid. Indeed, Jackson argues that the conditional ‘If a group act is right, and
it is in fact performed, then each individual constituent act is right’ is valid (Jackson
1987, p. 107). In the present setting, it is not. Given a closed plan consisting of one
or more optimal group actions, it might be that the group fulfills its group obligation
even though none of the group members fulfills her member obligation specified by
the plan. The model of Fig. 2 provides a counterexample. Consider the plan
fðai; ajÞg. Because it consists of a single optimal group action, it is closed. Suppose
that agent i performs action a0i and that agent j performs action a
0
j. Then the group
performs the optimal group action ða0i; a0jÞ even though neither agent i nor agent
j fulfills her member obligation specified by the plan.
Secondly, the conditional ‘If each group member fulfills her member obligation
specified by the plan, then the group itself fulfills its group obligation’ only holds
under the condition that the plan is closed. If the plan is not closed, the conditional
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might be false: given a plan that is not closed, it might be that each group member
fulfills her member obligation specified by the plan even though the group itself
does not fulfill its group obligation. To see this, let us return to Fig. 2, where Angela
and Bob will save a drowning person if and only if either (1) they both swim or (2)
they both use the motorized dinghy. Given that Angela and Bob adopt the (bad!)
group plan to save the drowning person either by swimming or by using the boat
(that is, they adopt the group plan fðai; ajÞ; ða0i; a0jÞg), it holds that if Angela were to
swim (ai) and Bob were to use the boat (a
0
j), then both Angela and Bob would fulfill
their member obligation specified by the plan, but the composition ðai; a0jÞ of their
individual actions would not amount to an optimal group action, and hence Angela
and Bob would not fulfill their collective obligation.
Thirdly, an individualist might point to the fact that member obligations are
obligations that individuals have and that this is all we need to vindicate logical
reductionism. This response is wide of the mark, because a member obligation is of
necessity a member obligation specified by a plan consisting of one or more optimal
group actions. This means that a member obligation essentially includes a reference
to a group. Group obligations are conceptually prior to member obligations, since
the group members determine their member obligations by reasoning from the
group obligation.27 As mentioned before, this kind of reasoning is called ‘we-
reasoning’ (Tuomela 2013). Kutz acknowledges the role of such reasoning in
determining member obligations when he writes that ‘[j]ointly acting agents must
reason backwards from the nature of the group act to an understanding of what each
should do if the group act is to be achieved’ (Kutz 2000a, pp. 83–84). It is hard to
see how this position squares with his individualism.
Fourthly, an individualistmight admit that memberobligations include a reference to a
group, but try to avoid the collectivist consequences of this admission by claiming that
this reference is inessential, because member obligations are in fact individual obligations
and individual obligations do not include any reference to a group. This response is
inadequate for two reasons. First, the proposed identification of member obligations and
individual obligations is not enough to meet the demands of individualism, because we
showed in Sect. 3.3 that group obligations do not imply (and nor are they implied by)
individual obligations. Secondly, we argued in Sect. 4 that fulfilling an individual
obligation is neither necessary nor sufficient for fulfilling a member obligation specified
by a plan: member obligations are not individual obligations.28
27 Copp, Isaacs, and Lawford-Smith defend closely related positions on the connection between group
obligations and member obligations. Copp (2007, p. 374) writes: ‘if a collective has a duty, this is itself a
moral consideration that gives at least some members a pro tanto duty to do their part in bringing it about
that the collective does its duty’. Isaacs (2011, p. 10) maintains that ‘collective obligation lends shape and
form to the obligations of individuals’. Compare Isaacs (2011, pp. 57–58). Lawford-Smith (2012, p. 463)
argues that ‘[g]roups have an obligation, which divides into parts in its bearing on the parts of the group,
the members’.
28 Our analysis ties in with Copp’s (2006, 2007) claim that individual obligations might conflict with and
even outweigh member obligations. Copp argues that member obligations are pro tanto obligations rather
than all-things-considered obligations. Accordingly, it might be that a group has an all-things-considered
obligation and that the group members have pro tanto member obligations. Such a pro tanto member
obligation might be outweighed by an all-things-considered individual obligation.
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We conclude from these four considerations that our analysis does not support
logical reductionism about group obligations and member obligations. Because
logical reductionism about forward-looking and backward-looking collective moral
responsibility is not to be had without logical reductionism about group obligations
and member obligations, our analysis also fails to support logical reductionism
about collective moral responsibility. All in all, our analysis vindicates collectivism
about collective obligations and about collective moral responsibility.
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Appendix
Lemma 1 (Horty 2001, p. 74) Let M ¼ hN; ðAiÞ; d; vi be a deontic game model.
Let G  N be a group of agents. Then
OptimalðGÞ 6¼ ;:
Proof Assume that OptimalðGÞ ¼ ;. By definition of M, it holds that AG is finite
and non-empty. Then for all a0G 2 AG there is an aG 2 AG such that aG 	 a0G. Because
AG is finite, there must be a cycle a
n
G 	 an1G 	    	 a2G 	 a1G ¼ anG with all mem-
bers aiG in AG. Because 	 is transitive, it holds that anG 	 anG, that is, anG  anG and
anG 6 anG. Contradiction. Therefore, OptimalðGÞ 6¼ ;. h
Lemma 2 (Kooi and Tamminga 2008, p. 9) Let M ¼ hN; ðAiÞ; d; vi be a deontic
game model. Let F  G  N. Let aF ; a0F 2 AF and let a00GF 2 AGF . Then
If aF  a0F ; then ðaF ; a00GF Þ  ða0F ; a00GF Þ:
Proof Assume that aF  a0F . Let a00GF 2 AGF . Suppose that a000G 2 AG. Then
ða00GF ; a000GÞ 2 AF . Hence, by our assumption it must be that
dðaF ; a00GF ; a000GÞ dða0F ; a00GF ; a000GÞ. Therefore, for all a000G 2 AG it holds that
dðaF ; a00GF ; a000GÞ dða0F ; a00GF ; a000GÞ. Hence, ðaF ; a00GF Þ  ða0F ; a00GF Þ. h
Theorem 1 Let /;w 2 L and G  N. Then
(i) 
 ðGÞ/ ! e½G/
(ii) 
 ½Gð/ ^ wÞ $ ð½G/ ^ ½GwÞ
1104 A. Tamminga, F. Hindriks
123
(iii) 
 ðGÞð/ ^ wÞ $ ððGÞ/ ^ ðGÞwÞ.
Proof (i) Assume that M; a 
 ðGÞ/. Then for all a0 2 A with a0G 2 OptimalðGÞ it
holds that M; a0 
 /. Because OptimalðGÞ 6¼ ;, there is an a0G 2 OptimalðGÞ. Sup-
pose that a00 2 A is such that a00G ¼ a0G. Then it must be that M; a00 
 /. Hence, for all
a00 2 A with a00G ¼ a0G it holds that M; a00 
 /. Then M; a0 
 ½G/. Hence, there is an
a0 2 A such that M; a0 
 ½G/. Therefore, M; a 
 e½G/.
(ii) ()) Assume that M; a 
 ½Gð/ ^ wÞ. Then for all a0 2 A with a0G ¼ aG it
holds that M; a0 
 / ^ w. Then for all a0 2 A with a0G ¼ aG it holds that M; a0 
 /
and for all a0 2 A with a0G ¼ aG it holds that M; a0 
 w. Hence, it must be that
M; a 
 ½G/ and M; a 
 ½Gw. Therefore, M; a 
 ½G/ ^ ½Gw.
(() Assume that M; a 
 ½G/ ^ ½Gw. Then M; a 
 ½G/ and M; a 
 ½Gw. Then
for all a0 2 A with a0G ¼ aG it holds that M; a0 
 / and for all a0 2 A with a0G ¼ aG it
holds that M; a0 
 w. Then for all a0 2 A with a0G ¼ aG it holds that M; a0 
 / ^ w.
Therefore, M; a 
 ½Gð/ ^ wÞ.
(iii) ()) Assume that M; a 
 ðGÞð/ ^ wÞ. Then for all a0 2 A with a0G 2
OptimalðGÞ it holds that M; a0 
 / ^ w. Then for all a0 2 A with a0G 2 OptimalðGÞ it
holds that M; a0 
 / and for all a0 2 A with a0G 2 OptimalðGÞ it holds that
M; a0 
 w. Hence, it must be that M; a 
 ðGÞ/ and M; a 
 ðGÞw. Therefore,
M; a 
 ðGÞ/ ^ ðGÞw.
(() Assume that M; a 
 ðGÞ/ ^ ðGÞw. Then M; a 
 ðGÞ/ and M; a 
 ðGÞw.
Then for all a0 2 A with a0G 2 OptimalðGÞ it holds that M; a0 
 / and for all a0 2 A
with a0G 2 OptimalðGÞ it holds that M; a0 
 w. Then for all a0 2 A with a0G 2
OptimalðGÞ it holds that M; a0 
 / ^ w. Therefore, M; a 
 ðGÞð/ ^ wÞ. h
Theorem 2 Let / 2 L. Then
(i) 
 ½F/ ! ½G/ for all F  G  N
(ii) 6
 ½G/ ! ½F/ for some F  G  N.
Proof (i) Assume that M; a 
 ½F/. Then for all a0 2 A with a0F ¼ aF it holds that
M; a0 
 /. Suppose that a00 2 A is such that a00G ¼ aG. Note that aG can be written as
ðaF ; aGF Þ. Then it must be that a00 ¼ ðaF ; aGF ; a00GÞ and a00F ¼ aF . Then it must
be that M; a00 
 /. Hence, for all a00 2 A with a00G ¼ aG it holds that M; a00 
 /.
Therefore, M; a 
 ½G/.
(ii) We define a model M ¼ hN; ðAiÞ; d; vi. Let N ¼ fi; jg be its set of agents. Let
Ai ¼ fai; a0ig be the set of actions available to agent i and let Aj ¼ faj; a0jg be the set
of actions available to agent j. Let the deontic ideality function d be defined as
follows: dðai; ajÞ ¼ dðai; a0jÞ ¼ dða0i; ajÞ ¼ dða0i; a0jÞ ¼ 1. Let the valuation function v
be defined as follows: vðpÞ ¼ fðai; ajÞg. See Fig. 4. Then it is easy to see that
M; ðai; ajÞ 
 ½i; jp and M; ðai; ajÞ 6
 ½ip. h
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Theorem 3 Let / 2 L. Then
(i) 6
 ðFÞ/ ! ðGÞ/ for some F  G  N
(ii) 6
 ðGÞ/ ! ðFÞ/ for some F  G  N.
Proof (i) Following Horty (2001, p. 126), we define a model M ¼ hN; ðAiÞ; d; vi.
Let N ¼ fi; jg be its set of agents. Let Ai ¼ fai; a0ig be the set of actions available to
agent i and let Aj ¼ faj; a0jg be the set of actions available to agent j. Let the deontic
ideality function d be defined as follows: dðai; ajÞ ¼ dðai; a0jÞ ¼ dða0i; ajÞ ¼ 1 and
dða0i; a0jÞ ¼ 0. Then OptimalðiÞ ¼ faig and Optimalði; jÞ ¼ fðai; ajÞ; ðai; a0jÞ; ða0i; ajÞg.
Let the valuation function v be defined as follows: vðpÞ ¼ fðai; ajÞ; ðai; a0jÞg. See




(ii) Following Horty (2001, p. 125), we define a model M ¼ hN; ðAiÞ; d; vi. Let
N ¼ fi; jg be its set of agents. Let Ai ¼ fai; a0ig be the set of actions available to
agent i and let Aj ¼ faj; a0jg be the set of actions available to agent j. Let the deontic
ideality function d be defined as follows: dðai; ajÞ ¼ dða0i; a0jÞ ¼ 1 and dðai; a0jÞ ¼
dða0i; ajÞ ¼ 0. Then OptimalðiÞ ¼ fai; a0ig and Optimalði; jÞ ¼ fðai; ajÞ; ða0i; a0jÞg. Let
the valuation function v be defined as follows: vðpÞ ¼ fðai; ajÞ; ðai; a0jÞ; ða0i; a0jÞg. See
Fig. 6. Then it is easy to see that for all action profiles a it holds that M; a 
 ði; jÞp
and M; a 6
 ðiÞp. h
Theorem 4 Let / 2 L and F  G  N. Then
(i) 
 ðFÞ/ ! :ðGÞ:/
(ii) 
 ðGÞ/ ! :ðFÞ:/.
Proof (i) Assume that M; a 
 ðFÞ/. Then for all a0 2 A with a0F 2 OptimalðFÞ it
holds that M; a0 
 /. Suppose that M; a 
 ðGÞ:/. Then for all a0 2 A with a0G 2
OptimalðGÞ it holds that M; a0 
 :/. Note that OptimalðGÞ 6¼ ;. Let a0 2 A be such
that a0G 2 OptimalðGÞ. Note that a0G ¼ ða0F ; a0GF Þ for an a0F 2 AF and an
a0GF 2 AGF . Suppose that a0F 2 OptimalðFÞ. Because a0F 2 OptimalðFÞ, it holds
Fig. 4 [i, j]p, but not [i]p
Fig. 5 (i)p, but not (i, j)p
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that M; a0 
 /. Because ða0F ; a0GF Þ ¼ a0G 2 OptimalðGÞ, it holds that M; a0 
 :/.
Contradiction. Hence, a0F 62 OptimalðFÞ. Then there must be an a00 2 A with a00F 2
OptimalðFÞ such that a00F 	 a0F . Hence, a00F  a0F . By Lemma 2, it must be that
ða00F ; a0GF Þ  ða0F ; a0GF Þ ¼ a0G. Note that for all a000 2 A with a000F ¼ a00F it holds that
M; a000 
 / and that ða00F ; a0GF Þ 2 AG. Hence, ða00F ; a0GF Þ 62 OptimalðGÞ. Then there
must be an a 2 A with aG 2 OptimalðGÞ such that aG 	 ða00F ; a0GF Þ. Because 	 is
transitive, it must be that aG 	 a0G. Hence, a0G 62 OptimalðGÞ. Contradiction. There-
fore, M; a 6
 ðGÞ:/. Hence, M; a 
 :ðGÞ:/.
(ii) Analogous to (i). h
Theorem 5 Let / 2 L. Then
(i) 
 ðF 1Þ/ ! :ðF 2Þ:/ for all F 1;F 2  N such that F 1 \ F 2 ¼ ;
(ii) 6
 ðF 1Þ/ ! :ðF 2Þ:/ for some F 1;F 2  N
(iii) 
 ððF 1Þ/ ^ ðF 2Þ:/Þ ! ð:ðGÞ/ ^ :ðGÞ:/Þ for all F 1;F 2  G  N
(iv) 
 ððGÞ/ _ ðGÞ:/Þ ! :ððF 1Þ/ ^ ðF 2Þ:/Þ for all F 1;F 2  G  N.
Proof (i) Following Horty (2001, p. 79), assume that M; a 
 ðF 1Þ/. Then for all
a0 2 A with a0F 1 2 OptimalðF 1Þ it holds that M; a
0 
 /. Because OptimalðF 1Þ 6¼ ;,
there is an a0 2 A with a0F 1 2 OptimalðF 1Þ. Suppose that M; a 
 ðF 2Þ:/. Then for
all a00 2 A with a00F 2 2 OptimalðF 2Þ it holds that M; a
00 
 :/. Because
OptimalðF 2Þ 6¼ ;, there is an a00 2 A with a00F 2 2 OptimalðF 2Þ. Because
F 1 \ F 2 ¼ ;, it holds that ða0F 1 ; a
00
F 2Þ 2 AF 1[F 2 . Let a
 ¼ ða0F 1 ; a
00
F 2 ; a
000
ðF 1[F 2ÞÞ for
some a000 2 A with a000ðF1[F 2Þ 2 AðF1[F 2Þ. Then M; a
 
 / and M; a 
 :/. Con-
tradiction. Therefore, M; a 
 :ðF 2Þ:/.
(ii) Following Kooi and Tamminga (2008, p. 16), we define a model
M ¼ hN; ðAiÞ; d; vi. Let N ¼ fi; j; kg be its set of agents. Let Ai ¼ fai; a0ig be the set
of actions available to agent i, let Aj ¼ faj; a0jg be the set of actions available to
agent j, and let Ak ¼ fak; a0kg be the set of actions available to agent k. Let the
deontic ideality function d be defined as follows: dðai; aj; akÞ ¼ dðai; aj; a0kÞ ¼
dðai; a0j; akÞ ¼ dða0i; aj; a0kÞ ¼ 1 and dðai; a0j; a0kÞ ¼ dða0i; aj; akÞ ¼ dða0i; a0j; akÞ ¼
Fig. 6 (i, j)p, but not (i)p
Fig. 7 (i, k)p and ðj; kÞ:p
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dða0i; a0j; a0kÞ ¼ 0. Let the valuation function v be defined as follows:
vðpÞ ¼ fðai; aj; akÞ; ðai; a0j; akÞg. See Fig. 7. Then it is easy to see that for all action
profiles a it holds that M; a 
 ði; kÞp and M; a 
 ðj; kÞ:p.
(iii) Use Theorem 4 and contraposition.
(iv) Use (iii) and contraposition. h
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